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In 2011, the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (AIA) 
was signed into law, bringing significant changes to the 
Patent Act of 1952. Arguably, the most substantial change 
was the demise of the “American approach” to patent law: 
the “first-to-invent” patent filing system. Congress, by 
enacting the AIA, changed America's patent system from 
“first-to-invent” to “first-inventor-to-file,” sparking 
controversy among patent scholars and practitioners, with 
some individuals arguing that this change was 
unconstitutional. Recently, the Federal Circuit faced an 
issue of first impression when an inventor challenged the 
constitutionality of the first-inventor-to-file provisions of 
the AIA, and by extension the AIA as a whole, under Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution in 
the case of MadStad Engineering, Inc. v. USPTO. While 
ruling against MadStad based on standing, and not on the 
constitutionality issue, the court gave some insight for a 
challenger to establish standing by showing a substantial 
risk of injury actually arising from the first-inventor-to-file 
                                                                                                             
* Christopher J. Ferrell, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 
2015. Thank you to Professor Sean O’Connor from the University of 
Washington and Dan Crouse of the law firm of Lee & Hayes PLLC for their 
brilliant insight into the constitutionality of patent law and for their oversight of 
this Article. 
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provision of the AIA. From the MadStad ruling, it is clear 
that the arguments of the constitutionality of the AIA’s first-
inventor-to-file provisions are far from settled. 
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Practitioners and academics alike have debated the 
constitutionality of the American Invents Act (“AIA”) since before 
it was signed into law on September 16, 2011.1 Notably, some 
                                                                                                             
1 See, e.g., Jonathan S. Massey, Why First To File Is Unconstitutional, in 
WHY H.R. 1249 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 1, 1 (2011), docs.piausa.org/112th-
Congress%20(2011-2012)/Why%20H.R.%201249%20is%20Unconstitutional 
.pdf; Andrew L. Sharp, Misguided Patent Reform: The Questionable 
Constitutionality of First-to-File, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1227, 1253 (2013); John 
Burke, Examining the Constitutionality of the Shift to "First Inventor to File" in 
the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 39 J. LEGIS. 69, 87 (2013); Edward C. 
Walterscheid, Priority of Invention: How the United States Came to Have a 
“First-to-Invent” Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263, 286 (1995); Eric P. 
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academics question the constitutionality of changing America’s 
first-to-invent patent system to a first-inventor-to-file patent 
system, bringing the United States in line with the rest of the 
world’s patent regimes.2 They argue that the implementation 
provisions of the AIA do not comport with the original intent 
behind Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution (the “IP Clause”) and the legislative history and intent 
behind patent law in America.3 A recent ruling by the Federal 
Circuit, Madstad Engineering, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, enlightens the procedural context of the continuing debate 
as to whether certain provisions of the AIA are constitutional.4 
Although the Court ruled that MadStad lacked federal standing, a 
constitutional challenge to the AIA could be brought if one were to 
follow the Federal Circuit’s murky path, achieve standing, and 
maintain a cognizable argument for unconstitutionality. 
In Part I, this Article sets out a brief historical backdrop of the 
Constitution’s IP Clause, explains how America came to have a 
first-to-invent patent system, and discusses who qualifies as a true 
“Inventor” under prior patent laws. Following the history of the IP 
Clause, Part II of this Article describes questions regarding the 
constitutionality of the AIA and arguments that the first-inventor-
to-file provisions of the AIA are unconstitutional. In Part III, this 
Article explores the MadStad case, its facts, procedure, and 
eventual majority opinion. Ruling against MadStad on the standing 
issue, the Federal Circuit avoided the constitutional issues 
MadStad raised in its initial complaint. The Federal Circuit’s 
opinion invites discussion of how one can establish standing to 
challenge the AIA. Finally, Part IV of this Article discusses the 
ramifications of the MadStad ruling; the constitutionality of the 
first-inventor-to-file patent system; and practice pointers on how 
standing can be achieved and what, if any, constitutional 
                                                                                                             
Vandenburg, America Invents Act: How It Affects Small Businesses, 50 IDAHO 
L. REV. 201, 205 (2013); see also Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
2 Dennis Crouch, First-to-File versus First-Inventor-to-File, PATENTLY-O 
(Dec. 11, 2009), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2009/12/first-to-file-versus-first-
inventor-to-file.html. 
3 Burke, supra note 1, at 87. 
4 Madstad Eng'g, Inc. v. USPTO, 756 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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challenges can be sustained. 
 
I. BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKDROP: THE “IP CLAUSE” AND WHO 
QUALIFIES AS AN INVENTOR 
 
Prior to the changes made by the AIA, the United States 
granted patent rights based on a first-to-invent system, whereby the 
first individual to conceive of a new invention and reduce it to 
practice received the patent.5 In order to understand the new first-
inventor-to-file system and its origins, it is helpful to briefly 
consider Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution and the historical definition of “Inventor.” 
 
A.  Development of the IP Clause: Who is an “Inventor?” 
 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (the “IP Clause”) of the 
Constitution states: “To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”6 Some scholars have argued that the IP Clause is the 
only clause granting power to Congress that specifically provides 
the authorized means to accomplish the clause’s stated purpose.7 
Some scholars argue that, because common usage and Supreme 
Court precedent indicate that the term “Inventor” actually means 
the “first inventor,” Congress is only authorized to endow first 
inventors with patent rights.8 Other scholars, however, believe that 
“to promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts” grants 
general power to Congress.9 What, then, is the constitutional 
meaning of an “Inventor”? Moreover, has Congress properly 
                                                                                                             
5 Vandenburg, supra note 1, at 205. 
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
7 Adam Mossoff, The First-to-File Provision in H.R. 1249 is 
Unconstitutional: A Textual and Historical Analysis, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR 
COLLEGE OF LAW (2011), http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/Patent/ 
MossoffHR1249Unconstitutional(2011).pdf. 
8 Sharp, supra note 1, at 1243. 
9 Andrew M. Hetherington, Constitutional Purpose and Inter-clause 
Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress by the Copyright Clause, 9 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 457, 507 (2003). 
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observed this in passage of the AIA? 
The common usage of the word “inventor” generally refers to a 
first inventor, not the second individual to discover the same or 
similar idea.10 In certain instances, however, “inventor” means 
anyone who brought the invention into another country, not 
necessarily the absolute first inventor in the world.11 When the 
Constitution was drafted, “inventor” meant “one who produces 
something new; a devisor of something not known before.”12 Only 
a first inventor can devise something not previously known; a 
second inventor does not produce anything new. Therefore, while a 
second inventor may rediscover an idea, he or she does not actually 
discover the idea.13  
The Constitution was not the only enactment relating to patent 
rights in the early days of the Republic. In 1790, Congress passed 
the first patent act, which authorized patents for any person who 
“invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, 
machine, or device . . . not before known or used.”14 Although 
certain congressional members believe that a first-to-invent system 
has been guaranteed by prior history, both the Supreme Court and 
Congress believe a first-inventor-to-file system brings the U.S. in 
line with the rest of the world. The Supreme Court has previously 
supported the idea that the first-to-invent system, which is different 
from other patent systems in place around the world, is 
constitutional.15 But, does the first-inventor-to-file system comport 
with prior definitions and remain constitutional? Almost every 
other country in the world awards patents to the first individual to 
file for a patent without considering whether the potential patentee 
was actually the first to invent the particular subject matter for 
                                                                                                             
10 Massey, supra note 1, at 2. 
11 Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early 
Republic, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 855 (1998). 
12 Id. 
13 Sharp, supra note 1, at 1243. 
14 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 110 (1790). 
15 Burke, supra note 1, at 87 (acknowledging Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (6 
Pet.) 292, 292 (1833) (“[I]t clearly appears, that it was the intention of the 
legislature, by a compliance with the requisites of the law, to vest the exclusive 
right in the inventor only . . . .”)). 
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which the patent is sought.16 Thus, Congress felt the need to align 
the American patent system with the world’s view of an 
“inventor.” 
 
B.  The Changing Landscape: The AIA and the “First-to-Invent” 
Patent Filing System 
 
The Supreme Court has given Congress wide latitude to define 
the patent system under the IP Clause.17 The Court noted that, 
although the IP Clause “is both a grant of power and a limitation,” 
Congress may “[w]ithin the limits of the constitutional grant . . . 
implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the 
policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional 
aim.”18 Although the Supreme Court has allowed Congress to 
define “inventor” to mean the first inventor to file, this does 
translate to a general prohibition against challenging the 
constitutionality of the AIA. 
When Congress enacted the AIA, it defined an inventor as the 
individual who is the first inventor to file with the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). As Congress noted in the 
AIA, “converting the United States patent system from ‘first to 
invent’ to . . . ‘first inventor to file’ . . . [provides] inventors with 
greater certainty regarding the scope of protection provided by the 
grant of exclusive rights to their discoveries.”19 With potential 
patent holders worried that their inventions and proprietary 
information may be encroached upon, some have challenged 
Congress’s way of thinking and questioned the legitimacy of the 
first-inventor-to-file system when legislative history, constitutional 
drafting, and case law have indicated otherwise. 
 
                                                                                                             
16 Id. (quoting Vito J. DeBari, International Harmonization of Patent Law: 
A Proposed Solution to the United States’ First-to-File Debate, 16 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 687, 687–88 (1993)). 
17 Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are 
There Limits on the United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 1, 7 (2004). 
18 Id. 
19 Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(o), 125 Stat. 
284, 293 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 100). 
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II. SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF THE AIA’S CONSTITUTIONALITY 
 
Beyond the arguments that the AIA does not comport with the 
IP Clause of the Constitution, other scholars have argued that the 
AIA is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause. In his article Misguided Patent Reform: The Questionable 
Constitutionality of First-to-File,  Andrew L. Sharp argues that the 
AIA’s constitutionality can be challenged under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.20 The Takings Clause states that 
“private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”21 The argument goes as follows: although the 
Takings Clause traditionally applies to eminent domain seizures, it 
also prevents the government from taking any constitutionally-
protected private property without just compensation.22 The 
Takings Clause has four elements: (1) an individual must have 
private property; (2) the government must take the private 
property; (3) the taking must be without just compensation; and (4) 
the taking must be in the public interest.23 
When the Patent Office awards patent rights to an individual 
other than the first inventor, it allows that individual to prevent the 
first inventor from using their invention. Ultimately, “whatever 
invention [an inventor] may thus conceive and perfect is his 
individual property.”24 Using the Supreme Court’s reasoning from 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,25 Sharp argues that patentable 
inventions are private property because those inventions possess 
many elements of real property.26 
Sharp also analogizes to the “real property” aspects of 
patentable intentions. Citing Phillips v. Washington Legal 
                                                                                                             
20 See Sharp, supra note 1, at 1248 (arguing that the Takings Clause 
prevents the government from taking an inventor’s private property without 
compensation and for the public use). 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
22 Sharp, supra note 1, at 1248 (citing United States v. Willow River Power 
Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945)). 
23 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496–97 (2005). 
24 Sharp, supra note 1, at 1250 (quoting Solomons v. United States, 137 
U.S. 342, 346 (1890)). 
25 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
26 Sharp, supra note 1, at 1249–54. 
7
Ferrell: Standing Room Only: <i>MadStad Engineering</i> and the Potential
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2015
212 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 10:3 
Foundation,27 Sharp notes that the Supreme Court held that “a 
State may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing 
traditional property interests long recognized under state law.”28 
As Sharp summarizes, because the Fifth Amendment applies 
equally to the state and federal governments, the reasoning in 
Phillips would also prohibit the federal government from taking 
first inventors' property via congressional action.29 Thus, Congress 
cannot simply revoke the Fifth Amendment protection that first 
inventors enjoy in patentable inventions. This revocation creates an 
unconstitutional “taking.” While this argument has yet to gain 
traction in federal court, it remains a potential ground for 
challenging the AIA. 
 
III. FACTS AND RULINGS OF MADSTAD ENGINEERING V. USPTO 
 
A.  Facts 
 
Mark Stadnyk is an inventor and the holder of three patents. 
Stadnyk’s company, MadStad Engineering, Inc., is a Florida 
corporation that developed and marketed Stadnyk’s inventions.30 
Together, Stadnyk and MadStad Engineering, Inc., (collectively 
“MadStad”) challenged the constitutionality of the AIA because, 
allegedly, they had to “maintain heightened security around 
potential inventions,” which increased business costs, including 
costs resulting from maintaining security against computer hackers 
who allegedly sought information about ideas that were “close to 
patentability.” MadStad claimed that it invested substantially in 
“hardware firewalls, . . . encryption software, . . . and the IT 
expertise to install and manage [those systems],” and also had to 
invest in additional equipment and facilities to produce, 
manufacture, and execute prototypes “increasing time and effort 
and higher costs relating to patent applications” costing 
                                                                                                             
27 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998). 
28 Sharp, supra note 1, at 1252. 
29 Id. at 1253. 
30 Madstad Eng'g, Inc. v. USPTO, No. 8:12-CV-1589-T-23MAP, 2013 WL 
3155280, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2013). 
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approximately $3,500.00.31 MadStad claimed the AIA’s new first-
inventor-to-file system imposes a burden of maintaining 
heightened secrecy around potential inventions until a patent 
application is filed, as “much of today's intellectual property . . . is 
created on or stored on computers, virtually all of which are 
connected to the Internet . . . . Since the [AIA] no longer concerns 
itself with actual inventorship, the new law makes it attractive and 
profitable for computer hackers to steal IP and file it as their own 
or to sell it to the highest bidder.”32 
MadStad sued the United States, the USPTO, and the Director 
of the USPTO (collectively the “Defendants”), claiming the AIA 
was unconstitutional and violated the IP Clause because “Congress 
[was] not authorized to award patents to the winners of the race to 
file at the USPTO.” MadStad sought injunctive and declaratory 
relief.33 The Defendants challenged MadStad’s standing to sue and 
filed a motion to dismiss. 
 
B.  Rulings 
 
1. District Court Rules Against MadStad: The Uphill Climb 
Begins 
 
At the district court level, the Defendants attacked MadStad’s 
standing to sue the USPTO and claim that the AIA was 
unconstitutional. In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must 
assert facts showing that, at the moment of the filing of the suit, 
“the plaintiff suffers from a concrete and imminent injury in fact 
(1) that results from the invasion of a legally protected interest, (2) 
that is causally and fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged 
conduct, and (3) that a favorable judicial determination likely will 
redress.”34 These three factors “constitute the core of Article III’s 
case-or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking federal 
                                                                                                             
31 Id. at *1–2. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555 (1992)). 
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jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence.”35 
MadStad argued that it suffered four “concrete injuries” from 
the enactment of the AIA: (1) the burden of maintaining 
heightened security protocols; (2) the need to maintain additional 
equipment to expedite product development; (3) the increased time 
and effort caused by the need to file additional patent applications; 
and (4) lost business and investment opportunities caused by the 
“chilling effect” of the AIA.36 The Defendants argued that 
MadStad’s harms were not actual or imminent (not “certainly 
impending”) and were partially within MadStad’s control.37 
After analyzing both sides’ arguments, the district court 
discussed Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme 
Court’s then-current directive on Article III standing.38 In Clapper, 
the Supreme Court reversed a judgment of the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals but agreed that, under Article III, an injury must 
be “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.”39 The 
MadStad district court stated that “imminence is concededly . . . an 
elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is 
to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article 
III purposes . . . . [T]hreatened injury must be certainly impending 
to constitute injury in fact . . . . [A]llegations of possible future 
injury” are insufficient.40 The district court in MadStad then 
recounted the injuries pled by the plaintiffs in Clapper, which 
included heightened travel costs for fear of government monitoring 
of personal conversations under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA), and noted that the Supreme Court 
determined that the “highly attenuated chain of possibilities 
present[ed] no prospect of a ‘certainly impending’ injury to the 
plaintiffs.”41 Finally, the MadStad court further emphasized that, 
                                                                                                             
35 Id. at *3. 
36 Id. at *2–3. 
37 Id. 
38 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). The case of Susan 
B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014), the Supreme Court’s new 
directive on standing, was not decided until 2014. 
39 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1140 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed 
Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2473, 2474 (2010)). 
40 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. 
41 Id. at 1148. 
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although the Clapper plaintiffs contended that they had standing 
because of costs incurred due to the reasonable risk of harm, the 
plaintiff’s costs were a form of “self-inflicted injuries” that were 
not “fairly traceable” to the claim.42 
The district court then compared the facts of Clapper to 
Madstad’s case. The MadStad court believed that, although the two 
cases had remarkably different fact patterns, there were some 
similarities: each plaintiff tested the constitutionality of a statute, 
and each plaintiff triggered an especially rigorous inquiry into the 
qualifications for his standing. Further, both plaintiffs responded to 
a perceived need to expend money to avoid “entirely hypothetical 
consequences of legislation;” that is, “the plaintiffs expended funds 
. . . in response to conjectural events . . . controlled entirely by the 
judgment and discretion of the plaintiffs.”43 Relying on Clapper, 
the district court held that MadStad did not have standing, and 
granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
 
2. Federal Circuit Hearing: No Rest for MadStad 
 
Madstad appealed the dismissal and requested that the Federal 
Circuit declare the AIA unconstitutional.44 The Federal Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s ruling and did not address the 
constitutionality argument.45 
 
a. Federal Circuit jurisdiction 
 
In the Federal Circuit’s opinion, the court first discussed 
whether it was authorized to hear the case under Article III. The 
court held that, based on previous Supreme Court rulings, the 
court’s jurisdiction was proper because (1) a resolution of the 
constitutional challenge would require the court to interpret the 
terms “inventor” and “first-inventor-to-file” under the AIA and to 
assess the interactions between those terms and the use of those 
terms in the IP Clause in the Constitution; and (2) both parties’ 
                                                                                                             
42 Id. at 1152. 
43 MadStad Eng’g, 2013 WL 3155280, at *5. 
44 MadStad Eng’g v. USPTO, 756 F.3d 1366, 1367 (2014). 
45 Id. at 1380. 
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briefs made clear that the definitional matters were at the heart of 
the dispute—precisely the type of issue the Supreme Court has 
classified as substantial in the relevant sense, as defined by its 
“importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole.”46 
Further, the court emphasized that Congress placed appeals for 
constitutional inquiries involving patents “within the province of 
the Federal Circuit.”47 
 
b. MadStad’s failed standing arguments 
 
The court next addressed MadStad’s standing to sue. The court 
recounted the minimum standing requirements, described above.48 
It then recounted the lower court’s reliance on Clapper and agreed 
with the lower court that an “acutely attenuated concatenation of 
events” was required for MadStad to actually suffer any injury 
traceable to the AIA.49 
MadStad made no argument that was persuasive to the Federal 
Circuit. The court analyzed all four of MadStad’s alleged injuries: 
the increased risk of computer hacking, the increased time and 
effort to file additional patent applications, the competitive 
disadvantage relative to competitors, and the lost business and 
investment opportunities.50 The court found none of those injuries 
sufficient to reverse the lower court’s ruling that MadStad did not 
have standing.51 
MadStad claimed it suffered redressable injury because it 
already expended money to enhance cyber security in response to 
an alleged increase in computer hacker threats.52 The court stated 
“the mere fact that MadStad, like all other people and companies, 
faces cyber threats does not create standing . . . . MadStad [cited] 
statistics that indicate hacking was a growing threat well before the 
                                                                                                             
46 Id. at 1371 (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1066 (2013)). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 
(2010)). 
49 Id. at 1373 (quoting MadStad Eng’g, 2013 WL 3155280, at *6). 
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AIA was even enacted.”53 The court discussed this point, finding 
that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the AIA would 
cause hackers to launch attacks that MadStad’s old security system 
could not handle and concluded that MadStad’s assumptions did 
not create standing.54 
Turning to the argument that MadStad had to increase its time 
and effort to file additional patent applications, the court analyzed 
whether MadStad had suffered actual or imminent injury because 
of the AIA.55 MadStad claimed that Stadnyk would be forced to 
move the invention process more quickly and file applications 
earlier than he might otherwise desire. The Defendants argued that 
MadStad had not filed any patent applications after the AIA was 
enacted, and that Stadnyk’s patents would still have to traverse the 
patent application process.56 While the court did not necessarily 
agree with the Defendant’s arguments, it agreed that MadStad did 
not establish standing based on “[MadStad’s] fear of being forced 
into filing a patent application . . . .”57 Quoting Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, the court found MadStad did not provide enough 
evidence to meet the “concrete, particularized, and actual or 
imminent injury requirement.”58 
For Madstad’s final two arguments—the competitive 
disadvantage relative to competitors and the lost business and 
investment opportunities—the court found MadStad’s concerns too 
“speculative and generalized” to meet the injury requirement.59 
MadStad argued that it would have to create in-house development 
and testing centers to compete with larger companies that have 
resources to protect their inventions.60 However, the court noted 
                                                                                                             
53 Id. at 1374. 
54 Id. (comparing to Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 
(2013)). 
55 Id. at 1375. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1376. 
58 Id. at 1377 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564–
65 (1992) (“[P]rofessions of ‘some day’ intentions without any description of 
concrete plans or indeed even any specification of when that some day will be 
do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent injury.’”)). 
59 Id. at 1377. 
60 Id. at 1378. 
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that this would require too many assumptions to connect the injury 
to the enactment of the AIA; MadStad had not shown that it 
actually had set up research facilities in response to the AIA, or 
that it was engaged in a research project that would use such 
facilities.61 Finally, the court was not persuaded by MadStad’s 
argument that non-disclosure agreements (put in place to combat 
theft) would dissuade potential investment opportunities, creating 
an actual or imminent injury sufficient to establish standing.62 
 
c. Clapper as appropriate precedent 
 
After finding that MadStad had failed to establish standing 
under the standard set forth in Clapper, the court addressed 
MadStad’s challenge to the district court’s reliance on Clapper. 
MadStad tried (and failed) to persuade the court that Clapper’s 
plaintiffs were not directly affected by the act they brought suit 
under (the FISA), and that the facts of Clapper in no way 
conformed to the facts in the current case.63 While the court agreed 
with MadStad’s argument, it concluded that many of the general 
standing principles set forth in Clapper were “enlightening and . . . 
controlling.”64 Much like the plaintiffs in Clapper, MadStad 
“present[ed] no concrete evidence to substantiate their fears, but 
instead rest[ed] on mere conjecture about possible government 
action.”65 MadStad provided no concrete evidence the enactment 
of the AIA would increase IP theft, and “MadStad [did] not allege 
or present evidence that anyone [was] trying to actively steal its IP 
because of the AIA.”66 
MadStad also argued that the court should apply the standing 
analysis employed by the Supreme Court in Susan B. Anthony List 
v. Driehaus.67 In Driehaus, the Court articulated a separate 
                                                                                                             
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1381. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1379–80. 
67 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014). 
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standard for the threat of impending injury.68 The Court, citing 
Clapper, stated that a “challenger need not expose himself to . . . 
prosecution to challenge a statute so long as the threat of arrest or 
prosecution is sufficiently ‘credible’ . . . . [A]n allegation of future 
injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending’ 
or there is a ‘substantial risk’ harm will occur.”69 The Madstad 
court, unpersuaded by the potential of other tests for standing 
based on different factual circumstances, held Clapper applied to 




Despite finding that MadStad lacked standing, the court by no 
means closed the door to a constitutional attack on the AIA. This, 
of course, is as long as one achieves standing under Article III and 
competently challenges the constitutionality of the AIA.  
While the plaintiffs in MadStad failed to establish standing due 
to lack of cognizable injury, future plaintiffs could do a few things 
to overcome this particular hurdle. In order to achieve standing 
under the Clapper standard (and to an outside extent the Driehaus 
standard), plaintiffs must present a substantial risk that harm will 
occur because of the enactment of the challenged congressional 
act. Based on the Federal Circuit’s opinion, a plaintiff would need 
to show that, because of the AIA, he or she has been harmed and 
the offending party has (1) stolen the potentially patentable idea 
and attempted to patent that idea; (2) hacked a patent holder’s data 
systems and taken potential proprietary information for the purpose 
of being the first inventor to file an invention; or (3) caused 
concrete injury because of the illegal decisions of independent 
actors stemming from the enactment of the AIA. Of course, any 
person filing a patent under the AIA is still subject to certain 
statutory requirements.71 Beyond the statutory provisions, a 
                                                                                                             
68 Id. at 2342–43. 
69 MadStad Eng’g, 756 F.3d at 1380 (quoting Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2340–41). 
70 Id. at 1381. 
71 A patent applicant must adhere to the Oath and Declaration requirement 
under §115(b) of the AIA (stating they are the original inventor) and is subject 
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plaintiff could bolster their standing to sue outside of the AIA’s 
provisions by showing harm similar to the Clapper standard: an 
injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.”72 
This could include: (1) evidence of harm arising out of the 
enactment of the AIA, including the harms listed above; (2) a 
suffering of current injury; or (3) a patentable invention or a patent 
ready for filing. 
If a plaintiff can establish standing, they would be able to argue 
that the AIA’s first-inventor-to-file provision is unconstitutional 
under the IP Clause or the Takings Clause. Thus, “the door 
remains open for a challenger to attempt to establish standing by 
demonstrating its alleged harms are ‘certainly impending’ through 
factual circumstances that support a ‘substantial risk’ of injury 




 MadStad did not close the door to a constitutional 
challenge of the AIA’s first-inventor-to-file provisions. 
 To establish standing when challenging the 
constitutionality of the AIA’s first-inventor-to-file 
provisions, practitioners should closely follow the 
standards set forth in Clapper, and to a lesser extent, 
Driehaus, and establish: a sufficiently “credible” allegation 
of future injury if the threatened injury is “certainly 
impending” or there is a “substantial risk” harm will occur. 
 A plaintiff could bolster their standing to sue by showing 
(1) evidence of harm arising out of the enactment of the 
AIA; (2) a suffering of current injury; and (3) a patentable 
invention or a patent ready for filing. 
                                                                                                             
to the AIA’s §135 Derivation Proceedings if another inventor believes they were 
indeed the first person to invent. 
72 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013). 
73 Natalie A. Bennett, Federal Circuit Sidesteps Constitutionality of AIA 
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